Franz-Stefan Gady: One issue I see here is that the perception…
One issue I see here is that the perception of a transparent battlespace (IMO semi-transparent at best) paired with the notion of accelerated kill-chains is a further widening of the technical and tactical levels of warfare from the operational and strategic-political levels of warfare, which creates essentially two wars, and makes successful war termination harder. The combination creates a war-termination problem by structurally widening the gap between the technical-tactical levels of war and the operational and strategic-political levels. Precision warfare encourages planners to substitute the act of striking for a theory of how striking produces not only political but also operational-level outcomes. Transparent battlespace assumptions make this substitution feel somewhat doctrinally respectable, because if you can see everything and kill what you see, any problem appears to dissolve into a targeting problem. This could turn into a dead-end. Beyond the strike as strategy paradox Amos Fox & I outlined before, I think that adversaries will increasingly price into their military and political decision-making overwhelming inferiority in closing of kill-chains and defeat at the tactical level and adapt their force design, structure and doctrines accordingly to “ride out” this form of precision warfare and still prevail or at least not suffer defeats at the other levels of warfare.
https://x.com/HoansSolo/status/2050080932871250355?s=20
